



Digressions on Falling: times, socialities and strategies - 







Balance is superior to all our categories
Henri Corbin

Not knowing what to fear more, touching the bottom or not touching the bottom. If I blank in touch down, then it must be a big fall. In any touch whatsoever the blank evokes a fall too. What's more, falling is the most lawful thing there is, and yet feels like nothing but unnatural and unprepared, experienced as a voiding of law.

Falling has a physiology. Across languages, falling has also a dictionary-worth of words to its name—some of them untranslateble— relating to its different stages and variations: cadere, deciduous, case, trip, drop, Ernstfall, Zufall, befall, Einfall, and all the jections of the world. Yet is there a logic to falling, a time, a metaphysics, an ethics, an aesthetics? I guess one can only use hyperboles, or this is a place where hyperboles are less inappropriate.

Can one, and how much can one control a fall? Is there a skill or technique to a fall? Getting better at falling like, falling better? Not falling and the control over the body it involves is familiar all right...but to what extent can falling itself be reclaimed from its ordinary accompaniments in convulsive urgency, in theoretical realization perhaps of the cartoon character's brief unconcerned habitation of the falling interval?

Falling is a logic

Let's say, the concept of a falling, a universality in falling, the essence of falling, as the source, bourne and culmination of individual fallings, is just a category mistake. For falling to enter a logic and knowing, if it falls into them, is to introduce —in its own falling way—distortions and insensible ripples to this form of capture by the universal. Falling can only be a labored and endangered universality, a labored institution. The singular falls into the type, and the type is cracked a little. The tumble of singularities can be stated by simply saying that there is no one fall, even if everything were to fall. Falling demands the incontrovertible primacy of the ''case'', over whatever would tend to absorb it, knowing that Casus, the case, is a fall. Falling is a laboring of logic at the hands of the most irrecusable history, its tumbling examples always outliers, always falling short and unequal.
The type of falling corresponds to the fact that one thinks one understands what's meant by a fall, and the crack is what this proposition invites in the sense of a vertigo of exemplarity.

Falling is a poetic physiology

Everything falls, yet when I fall it is a particular and dedicated system that is engaged in my physiology: the vestibular system which is the ''unappreciated'' factor of balance, the privileged task organ where the sense of a loss of balance is constituted. According to a NY Times piece by Natalie Angier, a specialist named Dr. Merfeld describes this ''organ'' by saying, ''It’s almost the absence of something rather than the presence.''​[1]​ So falling would be a sensitive absence, or a lacunary organ being disturbed. Other commentators point out how vestibular system plays an active role in self-other distinctions as well as self-other connections through empathy. Physiology of vestibular system is an absence that ensures a singular point of view and the capacity of that point of view to open up to others, whereas its disturbance is the disturbance of the absence that ensures a singular point of view and its normal openings to the others, causing possible breaches of integrity through collocations and misattributions. It is the capacity of expropriation that is affected, without this meaning a being led back to identity.

A horizontal falling sense that is responsible for empathy gets skewed. A research, we are told, ''showed that vestibular self-motion perception (measured on a whole-body motion platform imposing passive motions to the body) was influenced by the observation of videos showing passive whole-body motion of a body'' putting into play the loop between seeing and this elusive sense of interior balance.​[2]​ Moreover, ''this effect was correlated with scores of empathy: subjects that were the most empathic were more influenced by the observation of another body being moved passively'' (Deroualle and Lopez). If too empathetic, don't look at anyone or anything dangerously leaning. The report sums up an ordinary experience of other-sensitive vertigo. Not identical with but not entirely unrelated to the warning Wittgenstein makes against ''playing with the depths of another'', turning it into a much more everyday and literal risk than one realizes.

In disturbance then, a falling of one's own is undergone as the falling of others, or alternatively, another's fall is undergone as one's own fall, ultimately raising the question whether one self really falls at all when one falls. Falling is a natural equivalent for the sentiments of a poet like John Clare about, ''strange scenes mere shadows are to me, / Vague impersonifying things'' (''A Flitting''). A useful term exists for this situation of confusion, instanced in falling and vertigo in the name of an other: ''syncretic sociability'', adopted by Merleau-Ponty from the psychologist Henri Wallon. Merleau-Ponty writes: ''Syncretism here is the indistinction between me and the other, a confusion at the core of a situation that is common to us both''.​[3]​ After Wallon's example, who associated this experience of space with a specific developmental stage for the child, Merleau Ponty illustrated it by situations in which ''any attitude taken toward the child immediately provokes in him the complementary attitude''​[4]​ but nevertheless, allowing for late adult breakouts of the same, which is the case that interests me here.

A syncretic sociability is a vestibular sociality, a potential community of falling, and vice versa, a community of falling (not always one of gravity, mind you) can only be a form of a syncretic sociability: ''However, one must not look too much to the top of the pines being blown by strong wind. For if one begins to imagine oneself seated on their apex, in such a balancing act, one could, and even more naturally than if one were to find oneself on a swing (or in an elevator)...due to the strange and superb movement up there, feel oneself carried away'' (Henri Michaux, ''Council on the Subject of Pines'').​[5]​







Falling is a time

What are the privileged forms of temporality open to negotiation under falling? Michaux's vestibular imagination already sets the stakes quite high, claiming that as much as time can sediment and take the form of earthly material strata, one can fall all the way to other geological ages, the relationship and radical nonsimultaneity thereby established becoming only possible through a form of falling.

Thus falling is somewhow poised to mediate the most discontinuous —since one only falls from a continuity— and the most continuous forms of temporal scansion, along with the different scales involved. The great logical problem of the continuity of discontinuity that engross dialecticians is present in nonpropositional form in a fall.

Looking closer. Among all the other aspects of this scansion one of the most interesting is that falling should be the experience of an imminence, the unstable saddle of a duration or a being-toward-the-impact. A speculative falling, minutely scaled, that can apply as much to dancing and walking as the real falls one is used to never being used to. This vertigo of the next step, spread and distributed across the dancer's body was described with a certain fascination by Paul Valéry : ''_She filches from nature impossible attitudes, even under the very eye of Time!...She is divine in the Unstable, offers it as a gift to our regard!..._We never see her but about to fall'' (Dialogues).​[9]​ The excited response of the speakers in this dialogue certainly preserves some of the anxieties and rushes of the purported childhood experience of syncretism, and introduces a temporal dimension to it closely clinging to the skill exercised in the art of gratuitious prolongation of movements.

The editors of Valéry's notebooks inform his readers that Valéry suffered from vertigo, thus getting quite sensitized to this dimension of experience, which is about the twists and torsions of ordinary dimensions. In more personal notes of a directly introspective and phenomenological bent, Valéry drew attention to the experience of space in falling and used it to give the sense of space in general a physiological basis in the pylorus, a bodily cavity, pointing again to the way falling becomes the activity of an absence of sorts: ''Who would suspect that the stomach and the pylorus are foundations of space? That the relative stillness and overall movements of things are linked to the sensitivity of these organs?'' (Notebooks)​[10]​ Thus when the dancer keeps returning to the brink of falling, she becomes the medium of a vertigo prone sensibility perceptually linked to this spectacle. In other words, the ''sense of liberation'' (Leroi-Gourhan) which may attend spectacles of acrobatics and dance may also be tinged with a sense of a phobic imminence. The indirect distortions in the experience of time for the speakers in Valéry's dialogue, are certainly not only intellectual or dependent on a disinterested gaze at the play of forms, but have an almost clinical tenor. 

The next locus to visit in this examination of falling and time is an extension of a topos of non-simultaneity, a concern that already appeared in Michaux's strange episode. This time the main interlocutor is Maurice Blanchot, who was trying to read the signs of the relevance of Surrealism in a time that seemed to deny them that. Falling in fact has a strong resonance for Surrealism's attempts to alter the relations between desire, dreams and the real. As Jed Rasula also noted, André Breton's vivid understanding of the depths and strata of dreams regularly emerged in the form of a plea for falling: In the manifestoes he declares ''I prefer to fall'', already capitalizing on Gaston Bachelard's insightful observation that “the fall, even before any moral metaphor intervenes, is a constant psychic reality'' (Bachelard qtd. in Rasula).

In his appraisal of Surrealism, Blanchot also drew attention to the centrality of the figure of falling in its attempts to bring the marvelous into the ordinary, revisiting Breton's use of an old model of chance attributed to Cournot, in which chance consists of two independent lines of causality intersecting in a given point, a good illustration being getting struck by a falling flower pot before one has the opportunity to experience any exquisite vestibular sociality. Blanchot wants to offer another reading of this famous illustration and model, at once undermining and recouping it: ''The encounter: what comes without advent, what approaches face on, and nonetheless always by surprise, what requires waiting, and what waiting awaits but does not attain'' (The Infinite Conversation). His intervention aims to disrupt the implicit assumption of the destined arrival at a unitary and shared space and time which would be the condition of the encounter, be it with an object of desire, or an instigator of accidental cheap dying:
At the point of juncture—a unique point—what comes into relation remains without relation, and the unity that thus comes to the fore is but the surprising manifestation (a manifestation by surprise) of the ununifiable, the simultaneity of what cannot be together; from which we have to conclude, even should this ruin logic, that where the junction takes place it is disjunction that reigns over unitary structure and causes it to shatter.
Neither the finality of the object of encounter for one's powers and readiness to meet it, since one was not ready and there was no anterior promise, nor merely mechanically intersecting causal lines, since there is the experience of the ununifiable and an impossible communication. No exhaustion of the possibilities of this moment by the past, but the future opening in the space of a between where a meeting occurs only through the participants falling beside or behind themselves.

Falling also involves variations in tempo, accelerations and dilations of course. People who fall from a great height reportedly experience time in dilation, getting a sense of endlessness in the space of a few metric seconds. Take Chuck Berry, a skydiver, who had a non-voluntary free falling experience —due to a parachute failing to open— along these lines, discussed by Claudia Hammond in her aptly titled Time Warped. Not unrelated to the physiological underpinnings of falling, this effect might have something to do with ''the pulses getting faster'', and thus ''time getting slower'', Hammond informs, in the process suggesting a peripheral remedy to the fact that there may be no separate locus and dedicated organ for timekeeping in human physiology other than a dispersed assembly of proxies. No internal clock, but a vestibular sense that works like a dangerous diversion of a nonexistent one.

Then again, there is an experience of falling with a strange temporality that is not so much about falling human bodies, but about the human scales of observational viability in the face of alien materialities. Take the famous pitch drop experiment, whose target is observing and witnessing a highly viscous tarlike substance drop and drip, creating enormous challenges at once for the patience or slowness and the alertness or speedy grasp of the observers. Approximately a split second event around every seven-eight years, as Joshua Foer puts it in an informative Radiolab episode. A different vertigo is at stake perhaps, the one that makes the decision whether to wait or not wait meet its own abyss for human observers if unaided by cameras.

Finally, to return to human fallings, and literary by choice, there is at least one writer who manages to combine a falling behind oneself and a cadent time dilation—Hammond and Berry— across two different sketches with around 40 years of writerly activity separating them. It is no accident that he is the author responsible for the opening salvo of vestibular imaginary above. Henri Michaux never stopped thinking about falling.

In 1927, Michaux writes a short and self-contained fragment about a character called Benson, who ''threw himself from the 6th floor of a building in Broadway'': ''Only his body falls. He Benson, draws back, remains in mid-air opposite the fifty ninth floor or between the fifty-ninth and sixtieth, and watches the body which descends, descends, completes its descent and lands in pieces. Then slowly, Benson (the soul of Benson) begins to descend, sees his body up close and that it is no longer habitable; he begins to watch the crowd with an air of embarrassment...'' The delay from fear that separates the soul from the body, which crashes in rag doll style, while the soul floats in an out of body experience, taking in the details on the ground and worrying over the inconvenience its body creates, makes for a characteristic instance of Michaux's early dark humor. Yet that there is something more to it is brought home in another fragment, this time borne out by an instance in his ''Meidosems'' in Life in the Folds [La Vie dans les plis] (1951). Meidosems are Michaux's imaginary species and protoplasmic drifters—thereby with a built-in incapacity to be separated from their bodies— and since they are also Michaux's experimental test case for a sensory economy that foregrounds balance, it is no surprise that they gracefully fall in one of the sections devoted to their adventures: ''Falling for the sake of falling...they prefer to fall quietly, slightly adrift. No they aren't worried, descending calmly, calmly, arms and legs fully extended. No second thoughts. Why worry yet? They've still got a few more seconds before the crash'' (Meidosems– Trans. Elizabeth Jackson). 

Even later Michaux returns to the subject in 1971, with his text Tent Posts [Poteaux D'Angles]:
From high in the sky a man is falling. His speed is accelerating, speed for which he has no brake whatsoever. The time he has left dribbles away in silence. Falling now, nothing but falling...Coming events begin entering the sphere of the present...The ground below begins to lose remoteness, showing irregularities, shadows in places— what definitely implies a coming together, a fearsome coming together [rapprochement]....The ground — oh, how much in a hurry the ground suddenly is—to meet a man, just one, since there isn’t another in the air right now, at least not in sight. No one shoots at him any more. No need. None at all. Private S. closes his eyes. He’s seen enough for now. In a way, Private S.  has been falling for years. (Translation by Lynn Hoggard)
Certainly, apart from the minute description of the moments toward impact, bespeaking an extraordinary willingness and ability in the imaginary scanning and inhabitation of a falling perspective, the enigmatic close is what seals the uniqueness of this late fragment. What is equally interesting is that everything seems to be happening simultaneously to the telling, since only in the end is the present tense abandoned, which makes the writing itself take on something of the vertiginous experience and its irreversibility.

That Private S. has been falling for years, seems to tend toward an erasure of the difference between the fearsome urgency of a literal falling and a long drawn but metaphorical falling, yet it also underlines a repeat, continuity and structure embedded in the literal falling that calls its self-contained, securely instantaneous quality—pain and fear are short—into question. The drawn out time of the fall, stretched with the details of the observation taken in dilation, spills and communicates with day to day living at large. A certain familiarity with an abyssal loss of control rather more extensive than the purview of this episode emerges thanks to the experience of the fall—an experience itself a stand-in for other forms of falling beside oneself, or ''experience without experience'' from Montaigne to Rousseau.

For years, one only lives in a certain detached and aimless way, but apparently one can keep falling too. Words Blanchot and Derrida made much of, like ''abeyance'' and ''instance'', combining the fleeting and the incessant might be appropriate to the paradoxical temporality the fragment brings out of the fall. Thus there is another rapprochement at stake that is not only about the rapidly converging features of a landscape rushing toward the falling man, but also the convergence which  brings together an abeyant and literally suspended time, a question of irreversibility, and finally the implicit accelerations and dilations of a modified physiological scanning, all making for a compendium of falling temporality.

For a writer who warned against the mistake of looking for a writer's proclivities in the words he uses, instead of the more instructive omissions —''look instead for the words the author avoided''— the mediation of the discontinuous and the continuous falling established here also corresponds to another rapprochement, this time inside his writing career. It can easily be argued that what Michaux was looking for in the fall was nothing other than that kinship with the ''infinite'' that came to be an identifying marker of his work, especially around the experience of contemplation— aided by drugs or not, an experience itself typified by distortions involving dilation. What Marcus Boon writes in relation to Alesteir Crowley applies here too: ''Consciousness appeared to expand because of the time and space needed to process this excess of perception'' (The Road of Excess). Yet by the same token, falling can also be repositioned as one of the privileged forms Michaux's infinite takes.

The question of contemplation and the infinite, segues into another interesting one. The time of falling, strictly speaking, is the subject of the foregoing. Yet there is certainly a pre-fall and a post-fall. Gilles Deleuze once wrote, ''the daily attitude is what puts the before and after into the body, time into the body, the body as a revealer of the deadline'' (Time Image 189). By talking about falling, is one talking about a movement that cancels this type of internal spanning to time, by sheer force of gravity, thereby tripping ''falling'' into mere succession? Is there no way to reconcile ''the daily attitude'' with insights from falling? To think through these questions, it is worth looking into how the before and/or after are insinuated into the body astride a fall. And when talking specifically about a prefall, it is hard not to think about a panorama or a panoramic vision, unless one is falling through a tube or an elevator shaft, and that if only the elevator shaft is not in a dream.

I have the feeling that the sensory scrambles experienced in a falling interval cannot be grasped adequately without a thinking of panorama. Although one would not want to say falling is just an excuse for the exquisite panorama, with a license for hyperbole as I seized it before, I feel comfortable to assert that mere falling is a partial excuse for the experience of a previously absorbed panorama, its order, stillness, distance and even a certain serenity to be lost. Mere falling and its urgent lack-of-distance-despite-a-covering-of-a-distance, its flighty intimacy, only finds a place in a network of relationships and experiences that go through that moment of engrossment before, to reach the composite time—defined by a superimposition of non-simultaneity, staying suspended behind oneself, and dilation in irreversibility— of the fall proper (but how proper?) only later. 

Roland Barthes once suggested the following equation: ''panorama: contraction of time down to its erasure: one minute of panorama = powerful meditation on a detailed time —> transposition or exchange between space and time'' (The Neutral). Thus one necessarily falls from a relatively univalent phase and form of temporality, determined by panoramic contraction and commerce with space, into another temporality determined by a composition of different ryhthms, another adjustment between time and space, a domination by dilation and acute polyrhythmia. Moreover these times are in mutual envelopment, panorama necessarily vertiginous and dilatory all the same, just like falling inevitably continues the serenity of the time before on a certain elusive level.


Strategy from... where exactly?

This leads to a an interesting twist regarding the spatial determinations of falling, a twist concerned  with falling as the swirling and dissolution of the stable ''horizons'' of the panorama.

Hito Steyerl wrote, ''Our traditional sense of orientation—and, with it, modern concepts of time and space—are based on a stable line: the horizon line. Its stability hinges on the stability of an observer who is thought to be located on a ground of sorts a ground that can be imagined as stable'' (''In Free Fall''). This is not to evoke a trite pathos of groundlessness, although the rhetoric necessary for this pathos is hard to avoid sometimes. I take this tack only with the hope to advance or further stray in thinking about falling. Let us note that Steyerl's story of the undoing of linear perspective, as well as the stable line of horizon through various innovations in media, makes some familiar stops (from J. M. Turner to aerial surveillance, to cinema and other ''heterogenous, curved, collapsed perspectives'' across the board) to lead to a more subjective sense of free fall: ''Time is out of joint and we no longer know whether we are subjects or objects as we spiral down in an imperceptible free fall''. This quite uncontroversial observation of Steyerl, perhaps gets more interesting when it meets a more troublemaking counterpart in what Michel Foucault offered: ''Horizon is a pictorial, but also a strategic notion'' (''Questions on Geography'').

To take bearings then. 1) Horizon was. 2) It is no longer. 3) Horizon was strategic when it existed. 4) Therefore we are confronted with a void of strategy that is at the same time a free fall.

Not sure if Foucault had this in mind, but strategy, in military and logistic parlance corresponds to a necessary excessive foresight, exhaustive precautionary measures, the making of provisions against contingencies, dispensation over advanced techniques to guarantee these outcomes, like state of the art tracking equipment, radars, long distance everything, creating redundancies —like using 300 planes where 200 would be enough for an attack on the enemy...strategy is all these. Formulated in terms of its strategic status, falling evokes a distinction made by Alexander Kluge. Since Kluge considers strategy described in this way as a ''strategy from above'', the strategy from below might be a more bottom-up organization, with modest scales, little foresight and few advance opportunities to plan anything; somewhat lucky, with limited resources depending on individual ingenuity: like soliciting help, using informal channels, drawing on reserve strengths for second wind, being unsquashably resilient or like the Taoist's crooked tree unfit to cut.

The problem here however, is not exactly a strategy from below, but a falling strategy, not an oblique strategy but headlong cadent. What would it be? Pray to the ground not to take you, pray to the sky not to give you up? Take heart from the thought that what you are falling from is nothing to miss anyway (a lousy strategy, I agree). Lose consciousness. Make a phone call (there is Jason Statham in the film Crank). It is not that counterintuitive really; as long as there are situations where it is better to fall than stay upright, the act of falling can be a strategy (if one listens to Adam Phillips, who said ''there are situations in which it is more dangerous to keep your balance than to lose it'') while admittedly it may be trickier to find a strategy from within the time of falling.

Even here, it is possible to consult people with some experience. I do not think ''expert'' is ever the right word here. One of these people with a certain experience is the remarkable Felix Baumgartner, who fulfilled in real life some of Michaux's strangest dreams, and made a cosmically surreal adventure of falling from the space onto the earth, risking his life for a great cause whose greatness is obvious—his enterprise and success is world historical—but whose cause I am at a loss to define. 
As is well known, in the short video released of his breathtaking tumble to earth, Baumgartner falls into a ''violent spin'' that takes way too long for a man falling from space, and we hear: ''seems like I have to pass out'', and perhaps, for a second there, he passes out while falling. A stretch of nothing with too much atmospheric resistance or instability otherwise is ''put in perspective'', and a decision of resignation that is at the same time the only wise thing to do, comes to Baumgartner's aid. This counts as a strategy I think.






Charles Juliet, who made a book out of their talks with Samuel Beckett, brings up at a certain point how Beckett's vision and writing has a quality that embraces ''totality''. Very perceptively, Juliet talks about a look and grasp that impossibly combines an immersion into the concretion of the smallest insignificant details with a fixation of the gaze on the Sirius. Beckett answers, ''[finger pressed on the table, and finger rises] Here it is necessary to be millions of light years away...and yet...[silence]. It's the same thing if a leave falls or the Satan falls....[laughing] Amazing right? The same thing...'' (Conversations with Beckett and Van Velde).

Totality in the mode and conjugation of a fall is not that strange perhaps, since in a more directly materialist vein the Epicureans also had a similar vision with the rain of atoms whose swerves account for everything, but there is something that escapes that materialism in this relation to totality instanced in Beckett's words. A cognizance of difference at its acutest, the devil and the leaf, divine judgment and the immanence of deciduous trees, and a unity—let's not say monism, for the associations with a levelling ontology— on the level of that which doesn't have a generality, a unity on the level of falling. Falling is like being, except it is falling, and falling happens to everything divine and small in the same way, because everything falls. 

''Everything falls, says the Master of Ho. Everything falls, already you wander in the ruins of tomorrow...Everything hardens, says the Master of Ho, everything hardens and returns to the skull'' (Michaux, ''Sphinx''). Michaux's poem ''Sphinx'' from which these lines originate, is a piece from a short but fascinating series of poems with the same speaker, Master of Ho, an immemorial sage persona and a prophetic voice of a Blakean grandeur Michaux used to embrace visions of totality very similar to what Juliet attributed to Beckett. Among all the questions the poem naturally generates (like who is this Sphinx Michaux writes about in saying ''the man who talks to you is Sphinx. The man who you were, the father that you had, was Sphinx. And then, what did you understand of the Sphinx who made you submit?'') I expediently latch onto the easiest: The hardening and returning to the skull, and the polarized parallel it constitutes with a fall. Both are changes undergone, rather than actively pursued on some level, and as we know from Michaux's other writings too, falling may converge with hardening through a certain use of time: ''already in the ruins of tomorrow'', one only inhabits what is falling and crumbling, and in a time-lapse sufficiently long, everything is disintegrating. 

But perhaps what deviates from Beckett's terrifying equanimity in the previous, is a concern with freedom and submission. As if not falling could be the matter of a certain resistance or better, integrity... and this not in a simple sense of course: ''He who does not dissolve the one who comes to him, a Sphinx, grows there and it is from this Sphinx that one dies''. Here as well it's all very immanent, one falls and dies from what comes to one, and what comes to one is oneself (the man who you were was Sphinx) among the other parts of that long history including fathers. Although it may look like it, it is not a freedom from falling, or freedom from what decomposes in the way of falling that is sought, rather the emphasis is on a gesture not carried out in relation to what could not but fall anyway: ''The incomplete gesture, the faltering of the heart, the remark that strikes the ear is him, it is he himself, not understood, who will wound you and who, in time, will obstruct you, endlessly, with hard rocks''. Endlessly obstructing hard rocks, a further variation on the skull, have their origin in an innocuous failure to respond, whose repercussions have the inexorability of a fall. 





Earlier I referred to a syncretic sociability and its possibilities of incontinent, ''unpersonifying'' and prodigious empathy. And there is no reason why one should not inquire into the possibility of an ethics that takes account of falling and its sense, its ''organ'' that is simultaneosly like the absence of an ordinary organ. In one of his endlessly surprising and generous essays, Diderot wrote, ''I have never doubted the great influence of our senses and organs on our metaphysics and morals''...and he wondered, ''how imperfect, to say the least, would our morality seem to a being who had one more sense than we do...'' (Diderot ''Letter on the Blind''). Yet it turns out we are beings who might have one more sense than we ordinarily believe ourselves to have, which in this case is the vestibular: ''Aristotle famously counted five human sensory modalities: vision, hearing, taste, smell, and touch. Since then, his list has been expanded to include such potentially novel modalities as proprioception (our sense of the relative location of our limbs) and the vestibular sense (the sense of one’s orientation with respect to gravity)'' (Fiona McPherson - The Senses)

The perceptual-relational tack of syncretic sociability is not the only one to take around this question, and given an understanding of ethics as a dimension of practice, training (paideia) and learning, it is not impossible to make of virtue a certain flexible skill as people like Francisco Varela already insisted. But is not a skill for falling a falling skill? At this juncture, another interesting example is Peter Sloterdijk, the patron saint of hyperbole, who drew attention to faltering skill as a deprivational revelation of the training basis of ethics. 

In fact the scope of Sloterdijk's vision of Western Paideia is nothing less than ontological: ''Existence as such is an acrobatic achievement, and no one can say with certainty what training provides the necessary skills to master this discipline''. Naturally, from this position the whole Western pastoral, saintliness and virtue are understood as a ''pull from above''. Add to this Sloterdijk's riff on Binswanger in whose work artistic achievements of subjectivation themselves are conceptualized in relation to a precarious verticality: ''the dramas of intellectual and artistic self-realization are mostly located in the dimension of depth and height'' (You Must Change Your Life).

Falling then enters the scene when the footing gained as a result of long term potentiations of practice, is confronted with unstability and totters from its strange attraction position to another and lowlier basin of attraction of mediocrity: ''It is only upon advancing into the unmastered and unsecured that the problem of a fall arises - whether the protagonist undertakes something at their own risk for which they lack the technique, or attempts something new that they cannot have mastered by virtue of its untried nature''...and again ''Only if non-ability or non-consideration of the boundary conditions for ability interferes, as with the flight of Icarus, does a fall become likely''.





Ultimately something that could be taken as a simple mechanical happenstance, falling can also be an occasion of reflection on age old questions like the relation between chance and necessity. Without the grand metaphorics of historical downfalls and declines,  falling already is too much of a ''living modality'' to brook logical indifference, demanding a proliferation of equivocal tenses and persona. 

If it can be built, it can be toppled, and is already collapsing. Being in the fall does not necessarily mean being pinned to the immediate, but rather inhabiting a transitively blustery situation shot through with transindividual differences, differences of scale (meteors too fall), and even more metaphysical transfers between daily continuities and ruptures.
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